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Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
“The hungry Sheep look up, and are not fed,
But swoln with wind, and the rank mist they draw
Rot inwardly, and foul contagion spread…”
John Milton, Lycidas (1637)
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or
“mad cow disease” appears to have originated
from scrapie, an endemic spongiform encephal-
opathy of sheep and goats that has been
recognized in Europe since the mid-18th century
(1). It has since spread to most sheep-breeding
countries and is widespread in the United
Kingdom (UK), where until 1988 the rendered
carcasses of livestock (including sheep) were fed
to ruminants and other animals as a protein-rich
nutritional supplement.
During rendering, carcasses from which all
consumable parts had been removed were milled
and then decomposed in large vats by boiling at
atmospheric or higher pressures, producing an
aqueous slurry of protein under a layer of fat
(tallow). After the fat was removed, the slurry
was desiccated into a meat and bone meal
product that was packaged by the animal food
industry and distributed to owners of livestock
and other captive animals (e.g., zoo and
laboratory animals, breeding species, pets).
Although elements of the ensuing story are
still disputed (including its origin from scrapie,
rather than from unrecognized endemic BSE), it
appears likely that changes in the rendering
process that had taken place around 1980 allowed
the etiologic agent in infected carcasses to survive,
contaminate the protein supplement, and infect
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The epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the United Kingdom,
which began in 1986 and has affected nearly 200,000 cattle, is waning to a conclusion,
but leaves in its wake an outbreak of human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, most probably
resulting from the consumption of beef products contaminated by central nervous
system tissue. Although averaging only 10-15 cases a year since its first appearance in
1994, its future magnitude and geographic distribution (in countries that have imported
infected British cattle or cattle products, or have endogenous BSE) cannot yet be
predicted. The possibility that large numbers of apparently healthy persons might be
incubating the disease raises concerns about iatrogenic transmissions through
instrumentation (surgery and medical diagnostic procedures) and blood and organ
donations. Government agencies in many countries continue to implement new
measures to minimize this risk.7 Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Figure. Time course of epidemic bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the United Kingdom, 1986-2000, with
dates of major precautionary interventions. The mammalian ban on meat and bone meal in March 1996 extended
a 1994 ban for farmed food animal species to include all mammalian species.
SBO = specified bovine offals (brain, spinal cord, thymus, tonsil, spleen, and intestines from cattle >6 months of age); MBM =
meat and bone meal (protein residue produced by rendering).
cattle. Cattle carcasses and carcass wastes were
then recycled through the rendering plants,
increasing the levels of the now cattle-adapted
pathogen in the protein supplement and eventually
causing a full-scale BSE epidemic (2-5).
Recognition of this source of infection has led
to a series of countermeasures taken by the UK
and other countries to break the cycle of cattle
reinfection, restrict the geographic spread of
disease, and eliminate potential sources of new
infections (Figure, Appendix). Probably the
single most important measure in the UK was the
imposition in 1988 of a ruminant protein feed ban
that by 1992 began to bring the epidemic under
control. However, the loss of nearly 200,000
diseased cattle, followed by preemptive slaughter
and destruction of nearly four and a half million
asymptomatic cattle >30 months of age, has
crippled the British livestock industry and also
affected the tallow, gelatin, and pharmaceutical
industries, all of which make bovine-derived
products.
BSE is not restricted to the UK. Cases have
occurred in many other countries as a result of
imported live animals or livestock food supple-
ments (Table 1). In some countries, including the
UK, the incidence of new cases is decreasing, but
in other countries–France, Portugal, Germany,
Spain, and the Republic of Ireland–the incidence
appears to be increasing, or initial cases have
only recently appeared. The explanation for this
phenomenon is most probably improved case
ascertainment (supported by active surveillance
and immunologic methods), but new infections
from contaminated feed intended for other
species (e.g., pigs and poultry) may also be a
contributing factor. Although in many countries,
BSE has been identified in native-born cattle, no
indigenous index case has been reported outside
the UK (i.e., no case originating de novo or from
cow-to-cow transmission). Whatever the origin of
these cases, recycling of their contaminated
tissues through livestock feed supplements could
have occurred in the same way as in the UK.8 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001
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BSE has not occurred in the United States or
other countries that have historically imported
little or no live cattle, beef products, or livestock
nutritional supplements from the UK. Even
though rendering procedures in other countries
underwent changes similar to those in the UK
during the late 1970s, BSE has apparently
emerged solely within the UK. The most
plausible explanation is that the proportion of
sheep in the mix of rendered animal carcasses
and the proportion of scrapie infections in such
sheep were probably higher in the UK than
elsewhere. These proportions were apparently
sufficient to bring very low levels of the etiologic
agent in batches of rendered carcasses over the
threshold of transmission in the UK but not in
other countries (5). An alternative explanation
proposed in the recent Report of the BSE Inquiry
(6) is that a pathogenic mutation occurred in
cattle in the 1970s.
Either of these two hypotheses satisfies the
need for an etiologic “seed” to survive the altered
rendering process and escalate through recycling
of an ever-larger number of infected carcasses.
However, the bovine origin hypothesis assumes
that a mutation occurred only in the UK and not
in other countries where similar rendering
processes would also have led to epidemic BSE if
mutations were occurring. In humans, mutations
have occurred all over the world, not just in the
UK, and there is no reason to suppose that
humans differ in this respect from other
mammalian species. It would therefore be
peculiar if the UK had the misfortune to host the
cattle world’s only mutation.
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD)
How soon hath Time, the subtle thief of youth,
Stol’n on his wing my three and twentieth year!
John Milton, Sonnet (1632)
Within weeks of identification of the first case
of BSE, concern was expressed about human risk
(7-13), and as the epidemic unfolded, a series of
measures was taken to eradicate BSE and
prevent potentially infected tissues from reach-
ing the human food chain (Appendix). A
surveillance unit to monitor CJD was established
in the UK in May 1990, and 3 years later,
surveillance was extended to several other
European countries, coordinated through the
European Union. By this means it was hoped that
any change in the epidemiology of CJD in the UK
could be detected quickly and that the
significance of the change could be assessed by
comparison with the epidemiology of CJD in
continental Europe.
Concern was heightened by the discovery
that some exotic zoo ungulates, as well as
domestic and captive wild cats, were becoming
infected (14-18). The ungulates and domestic cats
had also been fed diets supplemented by meat
and bone meal, and the wild cats had been fed
uncooked tissues, including cattle heads and
spines. The possibility could therefore not be
ignored that the disease might also cross the
species barrier to humans from the consumption
of beef or dairy products, or perhaps from
occupational contact with cattle by ranchers,
dairymen, or slaughterhouse workers.
What muted concerns about human infection
was the presumption that BSE originated from
scrapie, and scrapie was not a human pathogen.
Nevertheless, even those who considered human
risk to be remote acknowledged that scrapie
might unpredictably show an altered host range
Table 1. Reported cases of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy in the United Kingdom and other
countries (as of December 2000)
Native Imported Total
Country cases cases cases
United Kingdom 180,376a    - 180,376
Republic of Ireland        487 12        499
Portugal        446   6        452
Switzerlandb        363    -        363
Franceb        150   1        151
Belgium          18    -          18
Netherlands            6    -            6
Liechtenstein            2    -            2
Denmark            1   1            2
Luxembourg            1    -            1
Germany            3   6            9
Oman             -   2            2
Italy             -   2            2
Spainc             -   2            2
Canada             -   1            1
Falklands (UK)             -   1            1
Azores (Portugal)d             -   1            1
Data from Organization of International Epizootics (Paris)
and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (UK).
aIncludes 1,287 cases in offshore British islands
bIncludes cases detected by active surveillance with
immunologic methods
cOrigin and dates of imported cases are under investigation.
dCase imported from Germany.9 Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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after passage through cattle. Experimental
precedents for such behavior were well known:
passage of mouse-adapted strains of scrapie
through hamsters altered their transmissibility
on back passage to rodents (19,20); human
strains of kuru or CJD did not transmit to ferrets
or goats until passaged through primates or cats
(21); and a bovine strain of BSE did not transmit
to hamsters until passaged through mice (22).
Alternatively, if BSE originated from a spontane-
ous mutation in cattle, experimental studies of
species susceptibility to this new strain of
transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE)
had not sufficiently advanced to predict that
humans would not be susceptible. Nevertheless,
during the 10 years after the first case of BSE was
identified, cases of CJD did not increase in groups
at high risk and continued to occur in the general
population with the same spectrum of clinical
and neuropathologic features as before the
appearance of BSE.
Then, from May to October 1995, the CJD
Surveillance Unit was notified of three cases of
CJD in patients 16, 19, and 29 years of age
(23,24). On neuropathologic examination, all
three patients had amyloid plaques, which was
unexpected in view of their occurrence in only
5%-10% of sporadic cases of CJD. The
comparative youth of the patients and this
unusual neuropathologic finding prompted a
search for similar features in patients whose
deaths might have been attributed to other
diagnoses. In particular, cases of subacute
sclerosing panencephalitis (SSPE) were scruti-
nized in view of a report from Poland that cases of
CJD in three young patients had been identified
by SSPE surveillance (25). No such cases were
found in a review of the UK SSPE register.
If CJD in young patients was not being
obscured by misdiagnosis, perhaps it reflected
increased physician awareness through publicity
surrounding BSE and iatrogenic CJD in
recipients of contaminated growth hormone, or
the active CJD surveillance program instituted
in the UK, or the availability of genetic and
proteinase-resistant protein (PrP) immunocy-
tochemistry. Although all these factors may have
contributed to ascertainment bias, most of the
excess cases were in older age groups, in which
CJD was now being diagnosed more often than in
earlier decades.
By December 1995, the Surveillance Unit had
been informed of 10 suspected cases of CJD in
persons <50 years of age. Some were found to
have sporadic or familial CJD or some other
disease; however, two of the patients, ages 29 and
30 years, were later  confirmed neuropathologi-
cally to have CJD and, like the previous three
CJD patients, had extensive plaque deposition.
As of January 1, 1996, the relationship between
these cases and BSE began to excite suspicion but
remained tentative because critical information
judged necessary to establish a probable
connection was still missing (Table 2).
During January, two additional cases of CJD
in young patients were neuropathologically
confirmed, and a distinctive clinical syndrome
associated with plaque formation was beginning
to emerge: young age at onset, early psychiatric
symptoms, prominent ataxia, absence of periodic
electroencephalographic activity, and a compara-
tively prolonged illness. However, each of these
features, alone or in combination, may also be
seen in classic sporadic or familial CJD. Caution
was further justified by a review of the records of
pre-1980 CJD patients in the UK, which
identified three young patients who shared some
of these features, and by the results of an inquiry
about young patients with CJD in other
European countries, which showed an age
distribution similar to that in the UK. A major
concern was that these seven apparently similar
cases might represent a heterogeneous group of
patients with sporadic and familial forms of CJD.
Table 2. Evolving assessment of criteria used to link bovine spongiform encephalopathy and variant Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease.
Assessment through early 1996
Criteria    Jan 1   Feb 1    Mar 1   Mar 8  Mar 20
Novel clinical phenotype Uncertain Possible Probable Probable Probable
Novel neuropathologic phenotype Uncertain Possible Probable Probable Probable
Distinct from pre-1980 cases in UK Unknown Possible Probable Probable Probable
No association with PRNP mutations Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Probable Probable
Distinct from cases outside UK Unknown Unknown Unknown Possible Probable10 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001
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Full comparative neuropathologic examination
of both pre- and post-1980 cases of CJD in young
persons was needed, along with PRNP gene
sequence analysis of as many cases as possible.
During February 1996, an additional case
was referred to the Surveillance Unit with a
clinical evolution similar to that of the previous
seven patients, and neuropathologic examination
of recent and historical cases confirmed that the
recent cases were indeed distinctive. In particu-
lar, a morphologically unusual form of plaque
was present in all cases: the florid or “daisy”
plaque in which an amyloid core was surrounded
by “petals” of spongiform change. As of March 1,
despite the likelihood that this group of patients
had a “new variant” of CJD, it was still unclear
whether mutations were involved and whether
such a syndrome was also occurring outside the
UK–both points essential to confirming the
association of this variant disease with exposure
to BSE.
On March 4, genetic analysis was completed
for six of the cases, and no pathogenic mutation
was identified. These results effectively ruled out
a genetic cause for the syndrome (although they
did not rule out a genetic predisposition) and left
the only remaining uncertainty–the geographic
distribution of the variant phenotype–to be
resolved by the European CJD surveillance
system. The answer came by March 20: none of
the young CJD patients in other European
countries had the clinical and neuropathologic
features of the UK cases. In the preceding week,
two more variant cases had been
neuropathologically confirmed, and a report on
the entire group of 10 cases concluded that an
unrecognized variant of CJD occurring only in
persons <45 years of age was probably due to
exposure to BSE (26).
This link has now been convincingly
established in laboratory studies showing
identical, distinctive biological and molecular
biological features of the pathologic agent
isolated from BSE-infected cattle and human
cases of vCJD (27-29). The source of contamina-
tion appears to have been beef. However, muscle
has never been reproducibly shown to contain the
infectious agent in any form of spongiform
encephalopathy, whatever the affected species,
and thus, infection most probably resulted from
beef products contaminated by nervous system
tissue. Contamination could have occurred in any
of the following ways: cerebral vascular emboli
from cranial stunning instruments used to
immobilize cattle before killing by exsan-
guination; contact of muscle with brain or spinal
cord tissue by saws or other tools used during
slaughter; inclusion of paraspinal ganglia in cuts
of meat containing vertebral tissue (e.g., T-bone
steaks); and perhaps most importantly, the
presence of residual spinal cord and paraspinal
ganglia tissue in the paste of “mechanically
recovered meat” (a carcass compression extract)
that could legally be added to cooked meat
products such as meat pies, beef sausages, and
various canned meat preparations. Measures
have since been taken to eliminate these sources
of potential contamination and limit the
consequences of any contamination that may
already have occurred (Appendix).
Although the amount of infectious tissue
ingested must be a critical determinant for the
transmission of BSE to humans in the form of
vCJD, the human genotype at polymorphic codon
129 of the PRNP gene appears to play an
important role in susceptibility to infection. The
encoding alternatives, methionine (Met) and
valine (Val), are distributed in the general
Caucasian population in the approximate
proportions of 50% Met/Val, 40% Met/Met, and
10% Val/Val. All 76 vCJD patients tested have
been homozygous for methionine, and the
apparently single infecting strain of BSE may not
be able to replicate in any other human genotype.
However, it is also possible that (as in the
analogous oral infection of kuru and in peripheral
iatrogenic CJD infections) heterozygotes are
comparatively resistant to disease and become ill
after longer incubation periods than those of
homozygotes (30-33).
Predictions about the vCJD Outbreak
Think not but that I know these things; or think
I know them not: not therefore am I short
Of knowing what I ought.
John Milton, Paradise Regained (1671)
The onset of illness in the first case of vCJD
occurred in early 1994, nearly a decade after the
first case of BSE was recognized in cattle.
Assuming that the earliest appearance of vCJD
reflects the earliest exposure to BSE, this
incubation period is consistent with those
following peripheral infections in experimental
animals and in cases of iatrogenic CJD in11 Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Table 3. Chronology of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease
(vCJD) in the United Kingdom and other European
countries, as of December 2000
Year of   United
onset Kingdom France Ireland
1994   8 1
1995 10
1996 11
1997 14
1998 17
1999a 20 (+4) 1 (+1) 1
2000a   1 (+2)
aParentheses indicate still-living persons with probable
vCJD or deceased persons whose diagnoses have not yet been
confirmed by neuropathologic examination. In 2000,
additional cases have been identified that do not yet meet the
minimum clinical criteria for a premortem diagnosis of
“probable” vCJD. Dates are for year of onset of illness, not
year of death.
humans. Through the end of November 2000, the
overall tally was 87 definite or probable cases of
vCJD in the UK, 2 confirmed and 1 probable case
in France, and a single confirmed case in the
Republic of Ireland (Table 3). The Irish patient
had lived for some years in England; however,
none of the French patients had lived in or visited
the UK, so their infection must have come either
from beef or beef products imported from the UK
(approximately 5%-10% of the beef consumed in
France) or from BSE-affected cattle in France.
From a European standpoint, it would be much
more troubling if imported beef were the source,
as most European countries also imported beef or
beef products from the UK, although in smaller
quantities.
Unlike the BSE epidemic, the vCJD outbreak
has shown only a modest increase during its first
6 years, and the number of cases with onsets in
2000 remains well below the previous year’s
total, although additional cases will certainly be
identified in coming months. The difference
between BSE and vCJD may be due to the fact
that, in humans, recycling of infected tissue has
not occurred, and thus the epidemic will evolve
much more slowly than in cattle, or the difference
may indicate a limited outbreak in humans due to
very small infectious doses that, except in
genetically susceptible persons, cannot sur-
mount the combined effects of a species barrier
and comparatively inefficient route of infection.
Much of the lingering uncertainty about the
extent of the vCJD outbreak is attributable to the
fact that the incubation period of vCJD is
unknown. If the average incubation period is 10
to 15 years, the earliest patients with vCJD
would have been infected in the early 1980s,
when BSE was still silently incubating in small
but increasing numbers of cattle. In this case, the
large increase in human exposure to contami-
nated tissues during the late 1980s could lead to
a parallel increase in cases of vCJD during the
next few years. If, however, the average
incubation period of vCJD is 5 to 10 years, the
earliest human infections would have begun in
the mid- to late 1980s, when exposure to BSE was
maximal. In this case, the outbreak of vCJD
should remain small because of measures to
eliminate both animal and human exposure to
BSE instituted from 1987 to 1997. Depending on
assumptions about the incubation period and
other variables, mathematical modeling predicts
that the total extent of the outbreak could range
from fewer than one hundred to hundreds of
thousands of cases (34-37).
If large numbers of infected persons are
silently incubating the disease, the potential for
human-to-human iatrogenic spread of vCJD is
very real. Such apparently healthy persons
would be subject to the same kinds of medical and
surgical procedures experienced by the general
population, including endoscopies, vascular
catheterizations, operations for trauma or
illness, and blood and organ donations. If, as
suspected, the amount and distribution of the
infectious agent in tissues of persons with vCJD
is greater than in other forms of CJD, the
exposure of medical and surgical instruments to
possibly infectious internal tissues and the
transfer of tissues as grafts and transplants
become a matter of much greater concern than
the nearly negligible risk currently posed by
cases of sporadic CJD.
Recent and Future Policy Decisions
A little onward lend thy guiding hand
To these dark steps, a little further on…
John Milton, Samson Agonistes (1671)
Several governments have implemented
policies to minimize the risk for human-to-
human disease transmission through blood
donations from apparently healthy persons who
may be in the incubation phase of vCJD. In the12 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001
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UK, where whole blood or blood products from
some persons who later died of vCJD have been
administered to others, all plasma is imported
and all blood from UK donors is filtered to
eliminate leukocytes, which are the most likely
carriers of infectivity in blood (38-40). In the
United States, a blood donor policy excludes
donations from anyone who has lived in or visited
the UK for a cumulative period of 6 months or
more during 1980 to 1996. The 6-month period
was based on the fact that >80% of total US
person-years in the UK would be excluded and
that the 2%-3% deficit of blood donors resulting
from the deferral could be absorbed by the blood
banking industry without undue shortages.
Several countries (Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Switzerland, Japan, and Germany)
have since applied these criteria and formulated
similar policies.
Because of the possibility of widespread
infection in the UK, concern extends beyond
blood and organ donors to the safe use of medical
and surgical instruments, particularly those
used in neurosurgery and ophthalmic surgery. In
the absence of a screening test, a zero-risk policy
is untenable because it would require termina-
tion of the national organ donor program. A
compromise might be the temporary deferral of
organ donors–or perhaps only corneal donors–
younger than 30 or 40 years of age. However, this
measure might so diminish (and panic) the donor
population as to be inadvisable. Similar
considerations apply to invasive medical and
surgical procedures: sound medical practice
cannot be suspended on the basis of a theoretical
risk for vCJD, and it would be unethical to deny
needed procedures to persons suspected of
having CJD. Under the circumstances, dispos-
able instruments should be used whenever
possible, and a standard sterilization protocol for
reusable instruments should be implemented
that includes the most stringent possible
disinfectants (e.g., the combined use of 1 N
sodium hydroxide and autoclaving at 134°C, as
recommended in the recent World Health
Organization guidelines on infection control for
CJD [41]). No effective sterilization procedure yet
exists for instruments or instrument parts too
delicate to withstand these harsh measures.
Each such instrument must be disinfected to the
maximum extent possible, for example by
washing repeatedly with detergent/proteinase
solutions and exposing the washed instruments
to less harsh chemicals (e.g., 6 M urea or 4 M
guanidinium thiocyanate) that have shown
moderate to good disinfection of TSE tissue
extracts (42-44).
An equally important issue is whether the
bovine-adapted scrapie agent has recrossed the
species barrier to sheep, carrying its newly
acquired ability to infect humans. The only
reliable method to distinguish strains of TSE is a
time-consuming comparison of incubation peri-
ods and topographic features of brain lesions
after injection into different strains of inbred
mice (28). Glycotyping of PrP strains extracted
from diseased brain tissue is much faster but has
not been convincingly shown to discriminate
reliably between BSE and scrapie. Moreover,
neither method has been used to test a sheep-
adapted strain of BSE (that is, after multiple
passages through sheep), which might have lost
the distinguishing characteristics found on
primary passage from cow to sheep.
If BSE did back-cross to sheep fed the same
contaminated meat and bone meal that infected
cattle, the consequences for humans will remain
limited to the same period of risk as BSE–roughly
1980 through 1996–unless sheep BSE, like sheep
scrapie, can be horizontally or maternally
transmitted. Without a test to discriminate
between the two diseases, there would be no
defense against the development of endemic BSE
in sheep and the consequent risk for human
infection from sheep as well as cows. Therefore,
global elimination of animal TSEs must seriously
be considered.
Such a goal is more practical than it was even
a few years ago. National programs to eliminate
scrapie have historically relied on selective
slaughter of blood lines or in some cases entire
flocks in which scrapie was identified, and all
such attempts have failed. Molecular genetic
tools are now available to guide scrapie-
resistance breeding programs that until recently
depended on field observation and classical
genetics, and immunologic tools can detect
preclinical scrapie infection in tonsils, third
eyelids, and possibly blood (45-48). The environ-
mental durability of TSE pathogens will make
their eradication difficult (49,50); however, the
global elimination of TSE in sheep and other
animals is a goal worth the expense, effort, and
patience that will be needed for its achievement.13 Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
Perspectives
Dr. Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Labo-
ratory of Central Nervous System Studies at the National
Institutes of Health. His most recent research focuses on
the problem of iatrogenic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and
on the potential for disease transmission through the ad-
ministration of blood or blood products. He serves as con-
sultant to the European CJD surveillance program and
as Chair of TSEAC, the transmissible spongiform en-
cephalopathy advisory committee of the United States
Food and Drug Administration.
References
  1. Brown P, Bradley R. 1755 and all that: a historical
primer of transmissible spongiform encephalopathy. Br
Med J 1998; 317:1688-92.
    2. Wells GAH, Scott AC, Johnson CT, Gunning RF,
Hancock RD, Jeffrey M, et al. A novel progressive
spongiform encephalopathy in cattle. Vet Rec
1987;121:419-20.
  3. Collee JG, Bradley R. BSE: a decade on-Part 1. Lancet
1997; 349:636-42.
  4. Collee JG, Bradley R. BSE: a decade on-Part 2. Lancet
1997; 349:715-21.
  5. Brown P. The risk of bovine spongiform encephalopa-
thy (“mad cow disease”) to human health. JAMA
1997;278:1008-11.
    6. The BSE inquiry: report, evidence and supporting
papers of the inquiry into the emergence and
identification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD)
and the action taken in response to it up to 20 March
1996. Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Chairman.
London: The Stationery Office. October 26, 2000.
  7. Holt TA, Phillips J. Bovine spongiform encephalopa-
thy. Br Med J 1988;296:1581-2.
  8. BSE and scrapie: agents for change [editorial]. Lancet
1988;ii:607-8.
    9. Taylor DM. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy and
human health. Vet Rec 1989;125:413-5.
10. Dealer SF, Lacey RW. Transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies: the threat of BSE to man. Food
Microbiol 1990;7:253-79.
11. Kimberlin RH. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy:
taking stock of the issues. Nature 1990;345:763-4.
12. Will RG. Is there a potential risk of transmission of BSE
to the human population and how may this be assessed?
In: Bradley R, Savey M, Marchant B, editors. Sub-acute
spongiform encephalopathies. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers; 1991. p. 179-86.
13. Brown P. The clinical epidemiology of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the context of bovine spongiform encephalopa-
thy. In: Bradley R, Savey M, Marchant B, editors. Sub-
acute spongiform encephalopathies. Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers; 1991. p. 195-202.
14. Jeffrey M, Wells GAH. Spongiform encephalopathy in a
Nyala (Tragelaphus angasi). Vet Pathol 1988;25:398-9.
15. Fleetwood AJ, Furley CW. Spongiform enecphalopathy
in an eland. Vet Rec 1990;126:408-9.
16. Wyatt JM, Pearson GR, Smerdon T, Gruffydd-Jones
TJ, Wells GAH. Spongiform encephalopathy in a cat.
Vet Rec 1990;126:513.
17. Kirkwood JK, Wells GAH, Wilesmith JW, Cunningham
AA, Jackson SI. Spongiform encephalopathy in an
Arabian oryx (Oryx leucoryx) and a greater kudu
(Tragelaphus strepsiceros). Vet Rec 1990;127:418-20.
18. Willoughby K, Kelly DF, Lyon DG, Wells GAH.
Spongiform encephalopathy in a captive puma (Felis
concolor). Vet Rec 1992;131:431-4.
19. Kimberlin RH, Cole S, Walker CA. Temporary and
permanent modifications to a single strain of mouse
scrapie on transmission to rats and hamsters. J Gen
Virol 1987;68: 1875-81.
20. Kimberlin RH, Walker CA, Fraser H. The genomic
identity of different strains of mouse scrapie is
expressed in hamsters and preserved on reisolation in
mice. J Gen Virol 1989;70: 2017-25.
21. Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC, Amyx H. Strain variation in
the viruses of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and kuru. In:
Prusiner SB, Hadlow WJ, editors. Slow transmissible
diseases of the nervous system. Volume 2. New York:
Academic Press; 1979. p. 87-110.
22. Foster JD, Hope J, McConnell I, Bruce M, Fraser H.
Transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy to
sheep, goats, and mice. Ann NY Acad Sci 1994;724:300-3.
23. Britton TC, Al-Sarraj S, Shaw C, Campbell T, Collinge
J. Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in a 16-year-old
in the UK. Lancet 1995;346:1155.
24. Bateman D, Hilton D, Love S, Zeidler M, Beck J,
Collinge J. Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in a 18-
year-old in the UK. Lancet 1995;346:1155-6.
25. Kulczycki J, Jedrzejowska H, Gajkowski K, Tarnows-
ka-Dziduszko E, Lojkowska W. Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in young people. Eur J Epidemiol 1991;5:501-4.
26. Will RG, Ironside, JW, Zeidler M, Cousens SN,
Estibeiro K, Alperovitch A, et al. A new variant of
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the UK. Lancet
1996;347:921-5.
27. Collinge J, Sidle KC, Heads J, Ironside J, Hill AF.
Molecular analysis of prion strain variation and the
aetiology of ‘new variant’ CJD. Nature 1996;383:685-90.
28. Bruce ME, Will RG, Ironside JW, McConnell I,
Drummond D, Suttie A, et al. Transmissions to mice
indicate that ‘new variant’ CJD is caused by the BSE
agent. Nature 1997;389:498-501.
29. Scott MR, Will R, Ironside J, Nguyen HB, Tremblay P,
DeArmond SJ, et al. Compelling transgenetic evidence
for transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
prions to humans. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
1999;96:15137-42.
30. Cervenáková L, Goldfarb LG, Garruto R, Lee H-E,
Gajdusek DC, Brown P. Phenotype-genotype studies in
kuru: implications for new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease. Proc Nat Acad Sci U S A 1998;95:13239-41.
31. Lee H-S, Brown P, Cervenáková L, Garruto RM, Alpers
MP, Gajdusek DC, et al. Evidence for susceptibility of
the 129MM PRNP genotype in epidemic kuru. J Infect
Dis 2000, in press.
32. d’Aignaux JH, Costagliola D, Maccario J, Billette de
Villemeur T, Brandel J-P, Deslys JP, et al.
Incubation period of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in
human growth hormone recipients in France.
Neurology 1999;53:1197-201.14 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001
Perspectives
33. Brown P, Preece M, Brandel J-P, Sato T, McShane L,
Zerr I, et al. Iatrogenic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease at the
millennium. Neurology 2000;55:1075-81.
34. Cousens SN, Vynnycky E, Zeidler M, Will RG, Smith
PG. Predicting the CJD epidemic in humans. Nature
1997;385:197-8.
35. Ghani AC, Ferguson NM, Donnelly CA Hagenaars
TJ, Anderson RM. Epidemiological determinants of
the pattern and magnitude of the vCJD epidemic in
Great Britain. Proc R Soc London (Series B)
1998;265:2443-52.
36. Donnelly CA, Ferguson NM. Predictions and scenario
analysis for vCJD. In: Statistical aspects of BSE and
vCJD: models for an epidemic. Boca Raton (FL): CRC
Press LLC 1999:163-94.
37. Ghani AC, Ferguson NM, Donnelly CA, Anderson RM.
Predicted vCJD mortality in Great Britain. Nature
2000;406:583-4.
38. Brown P. Can Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease be transmit-
ted by transfusion? Curr Opin Hematol 1995;76:472-7.
39. Brown P, Cervenáková L, McShane LM, Barber P,
Rubenstein R, Drohan WN. Further studies of blood
infectivity in an experimental model of tranmissible
spongiform encephalopathy, with an explanation of
why blood components do not transmit disease in
humans. Transfusion 1999;39: 1169-78.
40. Brown P, Cervenáková L. Reply to a letter to the editor.
Transfusion 2000;40:754-5.
41. WHO infection control guidelines for transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies: report of a WHO
Consultation. WHO/CDS/CSR/APH/2000.3. Geneva:
March 23-26, 1999.
42. Kimberlin RH, Walker CA. Competition between
strains of scrapie depends on the blocking agent being
infectious. Intervirology 1985;23:74-81.
43. Manuelidis L. Decontamination of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease and other transmissible agents. J Neurovirol
1997;3:62-5.
44. Pocchiari M, Peano S, Conz A, Eshkol A, Maillard,
Brown P, et al. Combination ultrafiltration and 6 M
urea treatment of human growth hormone effectively
minimizes risk from potential Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease virus contamination. Horm Res 1991;35:161-6.
45. Roels S, Vanopdenbosch E, Langeveld JP, Schreuder
BE. Immunohistochemical evaluation of tonsillar
tissue for preclinical screening of scrapie based on
surveillance in Belgium. Vet Rec 1999;145:524-5.
46. O’Rourke KI, Baszler TV, Besser TE, Miller JM, Cutlip
RC, Wells GA, et al. Preclinical diagnosis of scrapie by
immunohistochemistry of third eyelid lymphoid tissue.
J Clin Microbiol 2000;38:3254-9.
47. Schmerr MJ, Jenny AL, Bulgin MS, Miller JM, Hamir
AN, Cutlip RC, et al. Use of capillary electrophoresis
and fluorescent labeled peptides to detect the abnormal
prion protein in the blood of animals that are infected
with a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy. J
Chromatog A 1999;853:207-14.
48. Brown P, Cervenáková L, Diringer H. Blood infectivity
and the prospects for a diagnostic screening test in
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. J Lab Clin Med. In press
2001.
49. Palsson PA. Rida (scrapie) in Iceland and its
epidemiology. In: Prusiner SB, Hadlow WJ, editors.
Slow transmissible diseases of the nervous system.
Volume 1. New York: Academic Press; 1979. p. 357-66.
50. Brown P, Gadjusek DC. Survival of scrapie virus after
3 years’ interment. Lancet 1991;337:269-70.15 Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
Perspectives
Appendix
Table A. Measures taken to prevent the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy to animals
   Great European  United
Precautions   Britaina   Uniona   States
BSE made a notifiable disease June 1988 Apr 1990 Nov 1987
BSE surveillance, with histologic examination of brains June 1988 May 1990 May 1990
Ban on ruminant protein in ruminant feed July 1988
Ban on export of UK cattle born before July 1988 feed ban July 1989
Ban on import of live ruminants and most ruminant July/Nov 1989
  products from all BSE countries
Ban on export of UK cattle >6 months of age Mar 1990
Ban on SBO for use in animal nutrition; ban on export of SBO and Sept 1990
  feed containing SBO to EU countries
High-risk waste to be rendered at 133°C/3 bar/20 min (or other Nov 1990
   approved procedure)
Ban on export of SBO and feed containing SBO to non-EU countries July 1991
Ban on MBM from SBO in fertilizer Nov 1991
After Jan 1, 1995, rendering methods must sterilize BSE June 1994
Ban on mammalian MBM in ruminant feed July 1994
BSE surveillance includes immunohistologic features of brains Oct 1993
Ban on mammalian protein in ruminant feedb Nov 1994 Aug 1997
Ban on import of live ruminants and most ruminant products Dec 1997
  (including meat products) from all countries of Europe
Immunologic testing for ruminant protein in animal feed July 1995
Mammalian MBM prohibited from all animal feed/fertilizer Mar/Apr 1996
Slaughtered cattle >30 months old (except certain beef cattle Mar 1996
  >42 months old) ruled unfit for animal use
  (hides for leather excluded)
Mammalian MBM and MBM-containing feed recalled June 1996
All mammalian waste to be rendered at 133°C/3 bar/20 min July 1996
  (or other approved procedure)
Cattle tracing system improved Sept 1998
Quarantine of 3 sheep flocks imported from Europe with possible Oct 1998
  exposure to BSE (4 animals die with atypical TSE)
BSE surveillance of fallen stock (downer cows) is intensified Oct 1998
Proposal to eradicate scrapie is rejuvenated Nov 1999
Allow export of deboned beef from cattle >30 months old born Aug 1999
  after July 1996
Prohibit use of animal protein, including MBM and blood meal Dec 2000
  (but excluding milk, or fish meal for nonruminants) in feed for any
  farmed animal species (effective January 1, 2001)
Prohibit importation of rendered protein and rendering wastes Dec 2000
  originating or processed in Europe
aIn Northern Ireland and Scotland, dates of implementation sometimes differed from those shown for England and Wales; in
addition, individual European Union countries often adopted different measures on different dates.
bSome exemptions, e.g., milk, blood, and gelatin.
BSE: bovine spongiform encephalopathy; EU = European Union; MBM = meat and bone meal (protein residue produced by
rendering); SBO = specified bovine offals (brain, spinal cord, thymus, tonsil, spleen, and intestines from cattle >6 months of
age); TSE = transmissible spongiform encephalopathy.16 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 7, No. 1, January–February 2001
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Table B. Measures taken to prevent the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy to  humans
Great European United
Precautions Britaina Uniona States
Compulsory slaughter of BSE-affected cattle Aug 1988
Destroy milk from affected cattle (except for milk fed to cows’ own calves) Dec 1988
Ban on import of UK cattle born after July 1988 feed ban July 1989
Ban on SBO for domestic consumption Nov 1989
Ban on export to EU of SBO and certain other tissues, including Apr 1990 Apr 1990
  lymph nodes, pituitaries, and serum
Ban on export of live UK cattle (except calves <6 months old) June 1990 June 1990
Ban on use of head meat after skull opened Mar 1992
FDA recommends use of BSE/scrapie-free sources for materials used in Nov 1992
  dietary supplements; request for safety plans
Cell lines used for biologicals should be BSE agent-free May 1993
FDA requests that bovine source materials (except gelatin) used in Dec 1993
  manufacture of regulated products be restricted to BSE-free countries
Bone-in beef only from farms with no BSE for 6 years; if not BSE-free, July 1994
  must be deboned with visible nervous and lymphatic tissue removed
FDA requests that bovine-derived materials for animal use or for cosmetics Aug 1994
  and dietary supplements not be sourced from BSE countries
Thymus and intestines from calves <6 months old made SBO Nov 1994
Import of beef only from UK cattle 1) >30 months, or 2) from herds July 1995
  BSE-free for 6 years, or 3) if not BSE-free, deboned with visible
  nervous tissue and specified lymph nodes removed
SBO ban broadened to include whole skull (SBM) Aug 1995
MRM from bovine vertebral column banned and export prohibited Dec 1995
Removal of lymph nodes and visible nervous tissue from bovine meat Jan 1996
   >30 months exported to EU
Ban on export of all UK cattle and cattle products except milk Mar 1996
SBM ban broadened to include entire head (excluding uncontaminated tongue) Mar 1996
Slaughtered cattle >30 months (or certain beef cattle >42 months) ruled Mar 1996
  unfit for animal or human use (hides excepted)
FDA urges manufacturers of FDA-regulated human products to take May 1996
  steps to assure freedom from BSE agent
Partial lifting of export ban on tallow and gelatin June 1996
SBM ban broadened to include certain sheep and goat heads, spleens, Sept 1996
  and spinal cords (SRM)
FDA recommends withdrawal of plasma and plasma products made from Dec 1996
  pools to which persons who later died of CJD had contributed
CNS tissues excluded from cosmetic products for use in EU Jan 1997
BSE cohort cattle in UK ordered slaughtered and destroyed Jan 1997
Proposed ban on SRM in cosmetics for use in EU (effective October 2000) July 1997
SBM controls for cosmetics and medicinal products Mar 1997
FDA request to manufacturers that no bovine gelatin from BSE countries be Sept/Dec 1997
  used in injectable, implantable, or ophthalmic products; and that special
  precautions be applied to gelatin for oral and topical use
Ban on marketing cosmetic products containing SRM prepared before April 1, 1998 Mar 1998
Allow export of beef and beef products from cattle >30 months in Mar 1998
  certified BSE-free herds from Northern Ireland
Importation of all plasma and plasma products for use in UK Aug 1998
FDA limits plasma product withdrawals to pools at risk for Sept 1998
  contamination by vCJD donors
Slaughter and destruction of offspring born to BSE-affected cattle after July 1996 Jan 1999
FDA guidance to defer blood donors with >6 months cumulative Nov 1999
  residence in UK during 1980-1996
Leukodepletion of whole blood donations from UK residents Jul/Nov 1999
Public FDA discussion about possible risk associated with vaccines July 2000
  produced with bovine-derived materials from BSE countries
Withdrawal and destruction of a potentially tainted 1989 lot of polio Oct 2000
  vaccine from one manufacturer
SRM ban implemented (effective October 2000) July 2000
Ban on slaughter techniques that could contaminate cattle carcasses with July 2000
  brain emboli (e.g., pithing or pneumatic stun guns), effective Jan 2001
All cattle >30 months old must have brain examinations for proteinase-resis- Dec 2000
  tant protein (PrP) before entering the food chain (effective Jan-Jun 2001)
aIn Northern Ireland and Scotland, dates of implementation sometimes differed from those shown for England and Wales; in
addition, individual EU countries often adopted different measures on different dates.
CNS = central nervous system; EU = European Union; MRM = mechanically recovered meat; SBM = specified bovine materials
(SBO plus entire head, including eyes but excluding tongue); SBO = Specified bovine offals (brain, spinal cord, thymus, tonsils,
spleen, and intestines from cattle >6 months old); SRM = specified risk materials (SBM plus sheep and goat heads and spleens
from animals of any age, and spinal cords from animals >1 year old).